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CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE: 
MORAL PREROGATIVE OR IAWLESS ACT 
by 
Malcolm Cannon 
How should the law respond to civil disobedience? The question brings to issue a host of 
conflicting principles which any sophisticated legal system must reconcile or otherwise confront. 
Implicit in the act of civil disobedience is the troubling circumstance that either the structure of 
the law or its application is in some sense deficient in propriety, equity, or morality. The task for 
the law is to establish a framework for resolving cases of civil disobedience in a manner which best 
preserves the spirit of morality, justice, and practicality. For the purposes of this work, it is 
necessary to define those acts which may be properly classified as acts of civil disobedience. An 
act of civil disobedience, nonviolent but violating a law, involves the intentional breaking of, or 
non-compliance with, a law perceived by the perpetrator to conflict with personal principle or 
conscience. Civil disobedience may also involve the violation of an unrelated law to dramatize a 
law claimed to be immoral, or to protest some larger injustice in society. 
This paper is concerned with acts of nonviolent civil disobedience directed at particular laws 
that create moral conflict for the individual. The issue is ultimately a question of obligation: is the 
individual bound in such a way that the dictates of conscience are the ultimate determinants of 
duty, or are these categorical imperatives subordinate to those of the state in determining an in-
dividual's obligation in cases where the two sets of duties conflict? Can the state make allowances 
for individual conscience without undermining the integrity of its legal system? Erwin Griswold 
articulated this question when speaking before an audience at Tulane University School of Law. 
In his essay, delivered on the occasion of the Third Annual George Abel Dreyfus Lectures on Civil 
Liberties, he defined the importance of the issue for the individual: 'The ultimate sanctity of a 
man's own conscience is the intellectual and volitional composite that governs his conception of 
his relation to Eternal Truth" (Griswold 184). Here Griswold implies that the criteria that 
constitute the highest demand on individual conscience are each person's will and intellect, which 
determine how the individual defines her /himself in relation to those principles he/ she finds to 
be absolute and not subject to the tyranny of worldly circumstance. He reflected on the concerns 
for the state when he quoted John Locke from his Essay Concerning Civil Government: "May the 
sovereign be resisted as often as anyone shall find himself aggrieved, and but imagined he has 
not right done him? This will unhinge and overturn all politics, and instead of government and 
order, leave nothing but anarchy and confusion" (cited by Griswold, 184). By aid of this quote,. 
Griswold attempts to crystallize the issue for the state: If the state is contested every time citizens 
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believe themselves to have been wronged, will not the political process be torn asunder in the 
attempt to appease each individual? Will the state's accommodation ultimately defeat the purpose 
of government as the state retreats before the onslaught of anarchy? This is an argument on 
which opponents of civil disobedience consistently rely in their attempt to call into question the 
legitimacy of such acts. 
I intend to argue that it is not only possible, but appropriate for the state to make special but 
principled dispensations of justice in the adjudication of cases of civil disobedience. I will 
demonstrate that among competing theories of law, Dworkin's hermeneutic concept of law 
provides the most appropriate theoretical framework on which to base a response which will mete 
the greatest possible justice to both society and the conscientious violator. My argument will 
proceed in two steps: (1) I will take the fictitious Smithson case and view it in light of the theories 
of law proposed by Hart, Fuller and Dworkin, and determine which possible response to the 
Smithson case each would recommend; (2) I will then measure the theories and those responses 
to the Smithson case against four independent criteria, thereby demonstrating that Dworkin's 
interpretive framework cultivates a process oflaw in which the best response to civil disobedience 
may rationally be issued, and furthermore, that this process culminates in law which is ultimately 
the best that it can be. 
It is appropriate briefly to frame the Smithson case. Smithson is a thoughtful, sincere 
individual committed to his beliefs. He has a long history of opposition to almost all forms of 
violence and almost all wars. Only in the most extreme of instances could Smithson imagine 
personally engaging in acts related to a war. Smithson categorizes the second World War against 
Hitler and his atrocities as such a war in which his participation might have been morally justified. 
The conscientious objector's exemption is applicable only to those who demonstrate an opposi-
tion to all wars, irrespective of general or particular circumstances, and not those who can find 
justification for engaging in some particular war. The state's concern here is that permitting 
exemption from service on less abstract grounds would result in individuals becoming the 
arbiters of which war they would fight in. The state maintains that authority to exercise this 
prerogative is vested in the state policy makers as declared by the Constitution. Smithson was 
arrested for failing to report; subsequently he was tried and convicted and lost an appeals decision. 
Smithson is now faced with either accepting the state sanction, as moral duty compels, or martial 
service. In either case he is subjected to the compulsion of the state, but only in the former can 
he avoid violating his sincere convictions. How should the state respond? To further our 
investigation, we need to examine how three legal theorists, H. L. A Hart, Lon L. Fuller, and 
Ronald Dworkin, construe the adjudication of the Smithson case. 
Hart defines the concept of law as the union of primary rules of obligation with secondary 









killing and stealing. The secondary rules create powers, both public and private, through offices. 
What is germane to the issue of civil disobedience in Hart's concept oflaw is that it does not posit 
acceptance by those outside the system as a condition ofits properfunction. Further, his concept 
oflaw proceeds in the positivist tradition, defining all moral and legal issues as mutually exclusive 
of each other. For law as conceived by Hart, legality and worthiness are radically distinct 
characteristics. This theory accords judges and administrators no interpretive function, but 
rather leaves to them the task of applying the law to various cases. There is little or no room for 
principles, either ofindividual or social conscience in the administration oflaw, precisely because 
these principles are not legal ones. In Hart's system, it is thus clear that the state trying a civil 
disobedience case, is utterly bereft of options. There is no reasonable alternative to prosecution 
and conviction coupled with punishment to the full extent of the law. The selection of the option 
of full prosecution and conviction in the Smithson case denies judicial hearing of the issues that 
civil disobedience raises. If there is to be any legal recognition that either some feature of the law 
is deficient or that the concerns of conscience and morality which provoke civil disobedience have 
legitimate grounds, then this recognition must come through legislative channels. Specifically, 
in the Smithson case, to implement this response is to recognize only that Smithson does not 
qualify for the exemption, without recognition of his obvious sincerity. Furthermore, Hart's 
theory fails to address the issue Smithson raises by relegating the objective grounds of his defense 
to the status of inadmissible evidence, thereby denying Smithson any prospect of justice. 
Other less severe possible responses to cases of civil disobedience can in no way be 
accommodated by this theory, as they all involve an interpretive recognition that the moral 
convictions of Smithson should in some manner affect the adjudication and administration of 
justice in this case. In short, Hart's conventional and simplistic response commands a mechanical 
application of the law by the judge, and fails to recognize the issues that civil disobedience brings 
to bear on the legal proceedings. Although the issues of civil disobedience do not receive judicial 
redress, legislative redress is possible, even desirable, under Hart's system. The prospect of 
legislative redress, however, is cold comfort to an individual who is immediately subject to the 
compulsion of the state. This response does not immediately resolve the conflicting principles of 
a man's obligation to his conscience and his duty to the state. The issue of a growing disrespect 
for the law, if cases of civil disobedience are not given consideration, is not necessarily a problem 
for Hart's theory. As long as officials accept the system from the internal perspective, the 
population at large need not of necessity accept it also for it to function, at least in some minimal 
fashion. Ultimately, what makes Hart's theory so unsatisfactory is that it fails not only to describe 
how civil disobedience cases are treated in fact, but it also fails to incorporate into the legal 
framework any conventional notion of fairness as a foundation of justice. Rules and statutes 
displace discretion, which is essential to the equitable administration of justice, egalitarianism 
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notwithstanding. 
The full prosecution response to cases of civil disobedience is indicative of a system that 
promotes the principle that respect for the law must be "maintained at all costs," regardless of 
personal conviction. Howard Zinn debates this assertion in his book Civil Disobedience and 
Democracy. This unsophisticated assertion is intuitively appealing. However, as Zinn points out, 
it has two critical flaws. First, the logical extrapolation of such a position is that law has an intrinsic 
value, independent of concrete moral consideration. This implies that the rule of law is prior in 
significance to the just or unjust quality of a particular law. The individual in a democratic society 
is thus left in the untenable position of having to obey laws that are invalid for the individual or 
constitute a moral affront, for the sake of preserving the integrity of the legal system as a whole. 
Second, the law and order argument erroneously implies that the breaking of one law necessarily 
results in a weakening of society's spirit of obedience, the violation of many laws, and ultimately, 
in anarchy. This argument, however, mistakenly attributes destructive causal agency to an act 
of civil disobedience, when in fact it is primarily a symptom of a possible wrong in the legal system. 
It simply does not follow from the fact that people of principle and conscience selectively object 
to a law they consider invalid or immoral, that the less reflective, habitually obedient remainder 
of the citizenry will repudiate the rule oflaw, bringing about a general collapse of the legal system. 
That a viable legal system not only does, but should respond to civil disobedience with a sensitivity 
to the import of conflicting principles, and not blindly appeal to the integrity of the letter of law and 
order is now apparent, and we need to turn to those principles. 
Fuller's theory oflaw maintains that law is the enterprise of subjecting human conduct to the 
governance of rules. Law, for Fuller, is an enterprise, tied to a morality of aspiration rather than 
a static model, such as Hart describes. Fuller's theory of law places its emphasis on legislators, 
and demands of them that they follow the morality of aspiration when attempting to make law. The 
legislators, in an attempt to achieve the best possible law, must follow Fuller's eight criteria of the 
"morality aspiration" of law: generality, clarity, noncontradiction, promulgation, constancy, 
susceptibility to obedience, nonretrospectivity, and congruency ofrules and their administration. 
Fuller has created a procedural natural law theory that correlates the degree of a law's correspon-
dence to these criteria directly with the degree to which that law is qualified as good. Fuller 
portrays law as necessarily involving morality in the procedure of its creation, and not necessarily 
in the substantive outcome. As we would expect, Fuller's theory will handle the conflicting 
principles that civil disobedience presents to a legal system, in a manner vastly different from the 
treatment Hart accords such principles. 
Fuller is concerned with the status of law with respect to justice, fairness, and the role the 
legislature plays in forming such laws. He does not emphasize adjudication or the judiciary. That 
Smithson is sincere in his beliefs and has been confronted with a law that is impossible for him 
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to obey, presents an immediate anomaly in Fuller's concept of law. Together they violate one of 
his eight criteria for the inner morality oflaw, i.e., that it be possible to obey it. Here, the flexibility 
of his eight criteria enables him to some extent, to balance the various concerns raised by 
Smithson's case. Even though it is morally impossible for Smithson to obey, the law remains valid 
for the vast majority of the people. If the draft law is rewritten to accommodate Smithson, the law 
cannot help but violate the criteria of generality and clarity. As a result of this conflict, Fuller would 
elect to accept the violation of the criterion of susceptibility to obedience in Smithson's case, to 
satisfy the criteria of generality and clarity for the majority. 
One can understand that Fuller's system would, in the general interest of justice and with 
respect for the fact that this law is impossible for Smithson to obey, dismiss the extreme 
prosecution response. It is clear that the criterion of susceptibility to obedience is essential for 
Fuller, as he writes: 'To command what cannot be done is not to make law, for a command that 
cannot be obeyed serves no end but confusion, fear and chaos" (Fuller 37). If it is physically and 
morally possible to obey the law, then Fuller's theory can accommodate prosecutional responses 
to conscientious violation which are not extreme severity, yet allow the spirit of the rule of law to 
persist while preserving some measure of justice for the violator. To accommodate Smithson, 
who finds it physically possible, but morally impossible to obey the law, Fuller would allow 
compromise in one or more of his eight criteria. Since the vast majority of citizens will obey the 
law, Fuller would prefer that it remain in its original form. Ultimately, Fuller would allow the 
prosecution of Smithson for violating a morally impossible law, but in the interest of fairness and 
justice that his system intends, he would prefer acquittal or a light sentence. 
We have seen that as the complexity of the concept of law increases and the issues of legality 
and morality are jointly addressed under one legal system, we have more options available, and 
achieve a representation of law closer to the manner in which it actually functions. However, is 
it possible that the partial justice Fuller's theory offers, is a compromise of justice tantamount to 
a denial of justice? I will now argue for the position that Dworkin's theory of law as interpretive 
concept, with its emphasis on interpretational legal adjudication and administration, offers us the 
best framework within which to articulate issues of civil disobedience, and arrive at an appropriate 
response. 
For Dworkin, the best working constitution of his theory of law as an interpretive concept is 
law as integrity. This means that judges need to search for and apply fundamental principles in 
deciding cases. This process is divided into the preinterpretive, interpretive, and postinterpretive 
stages, with decisions based on a community's coherent ideals of justice and fairness. The judge, 
in his discretion, abides by a creative, interpretive process that reflects history, legislative intent, 
political theory and morality as embodied in law. These principled decisions must respect indi-
vidual rights, not just consensus opinion or majority interest. Immediately we recognize a 
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framework that takes into account the fact that interpretation is the act which judges actually 
perform in the disposition of cases, and that law is tempered by political morality. 
That Dworkin has created a model of law that reflects community concerns is clear. What 
remains is to understand how this model would handle the case of John Smithson. The key point 
of departure is the interpretive concept; this does not only apply to judges, but to prosecutors as 
well. Dworkin explains that prosecutors use interpretive skills to discern which cases should be 
prosecuted with great prejudice, as opposed to those which should be prosecuted less than fully 
or not at all. If the prosecutor interprets correctly in cases of civil disobedience, he will notice a 
difference in kind that distinguishes the civilly disobedient act from other transgressions. Civilly 
disobedient persons do not act out of personal greed or a desire to subvert the government; rather, 
they act because they believe the law is invalid, and compliance would violate their sincere 
convictions. The law, Dworkin argues, not only should recognize this salient fact, but does so every 
day. Prosecutors employ the very same faculty of discrimination when they decide which cases 
to bring to trial, and judges make all manner of discernments concerning a defendant's state of 
mind. In 1882 Judge Bowen quipped: " ... the state of a man's mind is as much a fact as the state 
of his digestion." Here Dworkin maintains that it is incumbent upon and desirable for the state 
to distinguish in this manner between the typical law-breaker and the law-breaker motivated by 
conscience. The interpretive concept allows us to establish that Smithson's transgression was not 
motivated by greed or intended to subvert the government. Additionally, the interpretive concept 
allows us to recognize that Smithson does not feel the draft law is a valid law. For Smithson, this 
law is invalid because it forces him to act against his conscience. This point raises constitutional 
issues on two accounts: (1) A law that forces Smithson into an unconscionable act may violate his 
right to freedom of religion because it restricts his freedom to practice his constitutional 
equivalent of a religion. (2) In the United States, the constitution allows that validity is, in degree, 
subject to conventional political morality. If that morality is in conflict with a statute, then 
constitutional questions and doubts must be raised proportionate to the magnitude of the conflict. 
The question now becomes, whether all manner of sincere or religious convictions condition 
the legitimacy of an illegal act? Does Dworkin intend to secure the right of a Nazi sympathizer to 
refuse to join the prosecution of a war against Hitler, along with the right of Smithson to avoid 
participation in a war he deems unjust? Clearly not. The flexibility of the interpretive theory allows 
for Smithson to abide his conscience without simultaneously securing the precedent for a Nazi 
sympathizer to do likewise. When a judge employs the interpretive concept, he is ever aware that 
his search for applicable principles should reflect a coherent conception of the community's 
political morality. There is no allowance in a nation constituted of democratic principles for the 
sanctioning of a conscientious objector classification based on sympathy for a system represent-
ing the antithesis of that nation's political morality.Just as the judge uses the interpretive concept 
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to discern the difference between criminal violations and conscientious violations of law, so too 
s/he uses the same concept to understand the differences between those sincere convictions 
which have a legitimate grounding in the nation's political morality and those which do not. 
Does Dworkin intend to secure the right of the segregationist to indulge in overtly racist acts, 
along with the right of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. to disobey segregationist laws? An appeal to 
political morality based on democratic principle may seem to imply this result. However, the 
interpretive concept demands more than a numerical majority as the condition oflegitimacy of the 
political morality. It is, or should be, well known even to casual observers of democracy that the 
will of the majority is hardly a principle of the good, though the two may be found to coincide. 
When Dworkin interprets law in the light of democratic principles, he refers to those presumed 
objective standards which imbue democracy with the spirit of human dignity: to human rights. 
Neither the greatest scientist nor the cleverest logician could construct a rational, moral 
justification of racist laws, and legitimately claim to ground such an argument on general 
humanistic principles. Smithson's defense, on the other hand, can claim precisely such a general 
grounding, and it is in this crucial respect that the two examples are diametrically opposed. The 
process allows the judge to rule that securing Dr. King's right to protest segregationist laws does 
not sanction the right of the segregationist to indulge in overtly racist acts. The question now is 
a matter of how these issues are weighed in light of the distinction between the opposition to all 
wars and opposition to almost all wars, as in Smithson's case. Dworkin has provided us with the 
interpretive framework which allows the judges and prosecutors to give consideration not only 
to Smithson's convictions, but also to these important constitutional issues, when deciding on a 
course of action. 
What is immediately apparent in Dworkin' s theory is that there is a variety of options available 
in the system for dealing with cases of civil disobedience. By contrast, Hart's and Fuller's models 
allowed for only one procedure - prosecution and punishment. According to Dworkin's 
interpretive concept, prosecution of Smithson is not present as a reasonable option. Dworkin 
believes in the responsiveness of the interpretive concept to democratic principles and does not 
subscribe to the positivist contention that law and morality are two distinct entities. His 
interpretive framework strives to reflect the very political morality that Hart's model rejects. That 
the foundation of the law is not subverted by Smithson's non-prosecution is a sufficient condition 
for Dworkin to establish that the process of appeal and legislative redress is a costly and less 
certain means by which justice could be administered. 
The law clearly works for the majority of the eligible draftees. That a law can or need be 
written to accommodate all possible scenarios of conscientious objection to war is not clear. That 
there can be a law that can reasonably be interpreted as valid and invalid by different groups at 
the same time is clear, and while the law's overall validity might be dubious, acts of disobedience 
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such as Smithson's help illuminate this fact about the legal system. Dworkin maintains that the 
government has a special responsibility to those who act on a reasonable judgement that a law is 
invalid. Governments should make accommodations for them as far as possible, when those 
accommodations are consistent with constitutionally well grounded policies. As a result of these 
constitutional concerns and democratic principles of individual rights, no decision to prosecute 
Smithson can be appropriate, whatever the outcome, and therefore a balancing of principles 
involved will encourage the law to "look the other way." In deciding for a no prosecution response 
I urge that within the interpretive framework, the principle that should carry the day in the 
Smithson case is the respect for an individual's need to obey a sincere, morally principled 
conviction above the obligations one has to the state. Society needs to respect citizens of principle 
and reflection to ensure that majority policy does not rule over individual right. The appropriate 
social expression of this respect, if it is to be significant, must take the form of legal accommoda-
tion. 
There are several arguments against this position that need to be addressed before it can hE 
considered legitimate. The Draconian assumption that all violators must be prosecuted in order 
to maintain the integrity of the rule of law is often used as an argument against the decision not 
to prosecute. While that argument, which comes under the principle of a citizen's duty to the state, 
was effectively dismissed when we addressed Hart's theory, its specific argument against not 
prosecuting draft resisters needs to be rebutted here. 
The issue becomes whether the failure to prosecute would lead to wholesale refusal to serve. 
Dworkin states that " ... it may not - there were social pressures including the threat of career 
disadvantages, that would have forced many young Americans to serve if drafted, even if they 
knew they would not go to jail if they refused. If the number would not have much increased, then 
the State should have left the dissenters alone, and I see no great harm in delaying any prosecution 
until the effect of that policy became clear. If the number of those who refused induction turned 
out to be large, this would argue for prosecution. But it would also make the problem academic, 
because if there had been sufficient dissent to bring us to that pass, it would have been most 
difficult to pursue the war in any event, except under a near totalitarian regime" (Dworkin 219). 
The statement demonstrates once more the flexibility of Dworkin'stheory. He contends that if 
large numbers of conscientious objectors materialize as a result of this principled decision, then 
a decision to prosecute could be employed. However, what seems to be a policy-over-principle 
decision becomes a moot point, because the same political morality that rendered Smithson's 
status unique, has now changed such that the majority of the new political morality will function 
to make the draft unconstitutional. The legal authority of government to conscript the service of 
the people for war vanishes along with the consensus that the nation requires their services for 
its defense. Dworkin touches on two key ideas here. The combined facts that wholesale draft-
13 
dodging is unlikely, and that impressive credentials must be brought to the draft board in order 
to qualify for an exemption, militate against the possibility of wholesale abuse-witness the 
implication of Judge Bowen's quote that a court can regularly determine a person's sincerity. If 
it appears unlikely that mass resistance or even fraudulent pretense will result from Smithson's 
exemption, then there is only one clear objection left: the objection that, by accommodating a 
conscientious objector such as Smithson who is opposed to almost all wars, we somehow place 
an unfair burden on those who submit to the draft. The argument rests upon the tacit premise that 
the law is either valid for all, or valid for none. However, it is the validity of the law itself which is 
..,. in doubt. It is no more the case that Smithson is deliberately violating a valid law, than it is that 
those who submit to conscription are deliberately adhering to an invalid law. 
Dworkin's theory ultimately accords recognition to the fact that there can indeed be well-
founded arguments in support of opposite ethical propositions. Neither the conscientious 
objector nor the conscientious supporter can be said to act in bad faith. Rather, it can be said that 
the moral priority of their principles does not correspond precisely, or that it holds true to different 
principles. In the former case, it is the degree of reasonable support the law lends to the 
individual's moral priorities, which determines the degree of the law's validity for that individual. 
In the latter case, it is the degree of correspondence between individual principle and political 
morality which objectifies the rightness of the one proposition and the wrongness of its opposite. 
Smithson's case is sincere and reasonable, and furthermore, it is in keeping with his nation's 
political morality. Thus the law is both subjectively and objectively invalid. 
Conscientious supporters, on the other hand, do not accept Smithson's argument. For them, 
the law applies, and though they support an objectively invalid law, the fact alone that they do 
support it renders it subjectively valid. That is why the conscientious supporter of conscription 
cannot be accused of deliberately adhering to an invalid law. The error the supporter makes is 
in failing to recognize the legitimacy of the objector's argument, which, like all meaningful 
arguments, is one of degree. This cognitive failure stems from an interpretation of all meaningful 
law as general (Smithson cannot be right because he claims exemption), and all good law as stable 
(Smithson cannot be right, or the law will collapse). Generality is thought to be a necessary and 
sufficient condition of stability, but Dworkin has pointed out that neither is this always the case, 
nor is unlimited stability an intrinsically valuable aspect of a legal system. 
Curiously, this puts Dworkin in the position of supporting objectively invalid laws. Let us 
recall, however, that Dworkin's is a theory which proposes not absolutely valid laws, but rather, 
a system of law which is the best it can be. The conscription statutes, taken in conjunction with 
appropriate interpretive legal administration, will yield law that is the best it can be. If Smithson's 
acquittal should lead to an avalanche of draft resistance, then the objective invalidity of those 
statutes will be manifest, and the appropriate reform measures enacted. If Smithson's acquittal 
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should not precipitate any mass movement, then the law has fulfilled its purpose in rendering 
justice to Smithson, while allowing the nation to pursue its policy objectives constitutionally. The 
law is always valid (subjectively) for those who respect it. There is, however, neither need nor 
reason to assume that the law is or ought to be perfectly general, as such cases as Smithson's attest 
to. 
Although the burden of service is redistributed, it does not follow that this redistribution is 
therefore inequitable to those who submit to the draft. The draft lottery presupposed no fixed 
rights, and by tolerating draft resisters we make only small shifts in the law's calculation of utility 
and fairness, Dworkin explains. He continues that it may cause small disadvantages in the lottery, 
but that is an entirely different issue from contradicting the moral rights of individual citizens 
(Dworkin 219). The position we have defended here is thatthe obligation to be civilly disobedient 
takes precedence over acquiescence to an individual's duty to the state. In doing so we have 
shown that the principle of a person's obligation to his conscience and individual rights reign 
supreme over the principles of a citizen's obligation to the state. In divining those principles we 
saw that Dworkin's interactive conception of law as integrity provided the best context in which 
to examine the conflicting principles in the Smithson case. 
The only issue that remains is to demonstrate that Dworkin' s theory is the most ideally suited 
among the three to handle cases of civil disobedience in a democracy. Our method will be to 
evaluate each theory on the basis of independent criteria. 
Due to its emphasis on judicial interpretation and administrative justice, Dworkin' s complex 
theory has the structured flexibility to accommodate varied responses to cases of civil disobedi-
ence. In addition, its ideological commitment to a legal system that reflects a community's 
coherent conception of justice and fairness and acts in a principled manner towards all its 
members, renders Dworkin's law disposed towards accepting the legitimacy of civil disobedi-
ence. 
The theories of Hart and Fuller, owing to their rigidity and lack of complexity, were limited 
in their responses to cases of civil disobedience. Fuller's theory, while ideologically concerned 
with fairness and justice, mainly addressed the legislative process. When these concepts of law 
are judged on the basis of a correspondence criterion to determine which best represents law the 
way it actually exists in the United States, Dworkin's interpretive concept again prevails. It is 
apparent that judges do interpret and not simply apply the law, and administration of justice by 
prosecutors likewise involves discernment and interpretation. It is to the positivists' discredit that 
Hart's theory cannot reflect this, and to the detriment of Fuller's theory that, while he acknowl-
edges such a role, he does not emphasize it. 
When the three competing theories are compared on the basis of pragmatic value, Dworkin' s 
theory again has a clear advantage over the others. The cost and the length of time involved in 
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disposing of cases according to Dworkin, is greatly reduced relative to the others. Although in 
Hart's system, civil disobedience cases are prosecuted with swiftness and certainty, the lack of 
judicial costs is balanced by the legislative costs of dealing with civil disobedience issues. The cost 
of implementing Fuller's theory would be relatively higher in both its administrative and 
legislative aspects. There are two causes from which this result emanates: First, Fuller places 
a high degree of emphasis on reforming the law through legislative procedures, a process that is 
costly in both money and time. Second and most important, Fuller's conception of the law as an 
aspiration of excellence guided by his eight criteria creates a dichotomous situation for him when 
disposing of civil disobedience cases. While the general concern for fairness is present in the 
construction of the law, it cannot be equally reflected in its application. Fuller has to prosecute 
because the attempt to rewrite the law would, as a matter of course, result in a lack of clarity and 
generality. His congruency criterion also demands some form of prosecution to avoid a 
divergence between the law as written and the law as administered. Ultimately Fuller's criteria 
force him to make compromises to arrive at an acceptable status for the law, a status that results 
in less than full justice for Smithson. 
By contrast, Dworkin's theory accords a greater discretionary latitude to the administrators 
of the law, thereby circumventing the inordinately high costs associated with frequent and 
protracted litigation. For Dworkin, the law consists not only of statutes, but also of their 
interpretive administration. Dworkin provides for the discretionary exercise of the interpretive 
skills of legal administrators because such judgements are required in a legal system that 
recognizes that the validity of statutes may reasonably be considered dubious. The discretion of 
judges and prosecuting attorneys is the key instrument in incorporating statutes and interpretive 
administration into a principled, coherent, and pragmatic system of law. 
With regard to the complexity of the law, Hart and Fuller's theories provide society with much 
more readily understood systems. In particular, Hart's system leaves little doubt as to which way 
the law must proceed in cases of civil disobedience. However, it is the very simplicity of these 
systems which renders them limited in their capacity to do justice to the varied and conflicting 
principles involved in cases of civil disobedience. It is to the credit of Dworkin's system that it is 
able to process complex cases, while at the same time distribute justice according to principles 
essentially moral and/ or pragmatic. His system recognizes that there is no ultimate principle of 
justice, or consistent set of such principles, that allows the legal process to flourish in all cases 
despite these encumbrances. This is not to say that Dworkin believes there is not a best principle 
to apply in each case, as for Dworkin clearly there is, but rather he realizes that in tough cases 
opposing sides can sometimes make a legitimate appeal to the same principle. It is when this 
conflict between principles occurs that Dworkin allows the judge to use the creative interpretive 
process. The predictability of Hart's system, which is an extension of its simplicity, is a potentially 
-- - -- --- - -
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important desideratum of a legal system. However, the value of the predictive capacity is called 
into question if the system's capacity to dispense justice is proportionally diminished. Dworkin's 
theory strikes the balance between these two largely exclusive desiderata in the favor of justice. 
Ultimately, the dispensation of justice is the most important function of a legal system. For 
Hart, the greatest amount of justice is achieved by the ordering of society through the rule oflaw. 
Yet the application of Hart's concept of law to Smithson's case clearly results in a denial of justice 
to the defendant. While it is possible that the principles raised by Smithson's case might receive 
appropriate treatment in the legislature, these facts remain: (1) Smithson would be prosecuted, 
(2) Smithson would be convicted, and (3) Smithson would be punished. The lack of justice stems 
from the fact that Smithson suffers the compulsion of the state for violating law of dubious validity 
in performing an act of reasonable, morally principled civil disobedience. Hart's system denies 
Smithson the complete acquittal that justice demands. 
Fuller's system comes closer to providing for the satisfaction of our concept of justice in the 
sense that the compulsion to which Smithson could be subjected is significantly mitigated. 
However, justice compromised is, to some degree, justice denied. Fuller's theory does allow a 
greater measure of justice than Hart's theory for the conscientious violator. Fuller interprets 
justice as the aspiration of human excellence in the creation of law which is intended to result in 
statute that is the best it can be. Fuller acknowledges the existence of laws that fail to measure 
up to the goals of these aspirations. His theory emphasizes the legislative process as the 
appropriate device for implementing the reform of such defective laws. Though Fuller's theory 
is more merciful and understanding of the motive and rationale of the conscientious violator, it is 
still unjust in that, and to the degree that, it brands the conscientious violator an outlaw by 
attaching the inevitable stigma associated with prosecution. 
Dworkin's theory accords legal status to the rational, principled moral grounds on which the 
conscientious violator stakes his claim. This grant is possible because Dworkin's theory accounts 
quite sensibly for the fact that legitimate ethical disputes can arise where the validity of the law 
is dubious. Therefore it is possible, under Dworkin's theory, to rule in such a way that the 
conscientious violator can receive justice without society suffering a proportional defect in the 
integrity of the rule of the law. The reason the rule oflaw is not harmed by such apparently adverse 
rulings is that Dworkin's theory appears to achieve justice at the expense of the generality and 
clarity of the law. However, a more sophisticated examination reveals that this is not the case. The 
defect in generality and clarity is correctly interpreted by Dworkin to be inherent not in the law, 
but rather in the statute (as it applies to Smithson), which constitutes but one aspect of the law. 
Based on criteria of correspondence, utility, simplicity, and justice, it is clear that an 
interpretive concept oflaw has much more to offer a society than competing concepts. It has been 
shown that the most problematic aspect of these competing theories was their failure to 
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accommodate the just cause of the conscientious violator, on account of their unsophisticated 
concepts of the absolute essence of law's validity, and their failure to recognize the composition 
oflaw as interpretive administration in addition to statutes, rather than merely the latter. Because 
of these theoretical deficiencies, these theories can do no more than dispense partial justice 
(Fuller), or no justice at all (Hart), to the rationally and morally motivated conscientious violator. 
It is especially ironic that Hart's theory should deal with such an important case in this manner, 
while simultaneously regarding the absolute essence of the validity of statutes as key to the 
preservation of an ordered society through the rule of law. As John F. Kennedy said on 
March 12, 1962 in an address before Latin American diplomats in the White House, 'Those 
systems which make peaceful revolution impossible make violent revolution inevitable." 
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